

OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR



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February 1995

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by

Hugo E. Mayer

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
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REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

Form Approved
OMB No. 0704-0188

Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188), Washington, DC 20503.

1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)		2. REPORT DATE		3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR				5. FUNDING NUMBERS	
6. AUTHOR(S) Dr. Hugo Mayer, Dr. Edward George, MAJ Bruce Rickert, Mr. John Noble, and CPT Robert Coy					
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Verification and Validation Division Simulation and Data Standards Directorate Operations Analysis Center, TRADOC Analysis Center Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027-2345				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)				10. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER	
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES					
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED				12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE	
13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words) This report provides information about operations other than war (OOTW), and provides a task analysis of OOTW activities. The study deals with 4 of the 13 OOTW activities identified in FM 100-5. They are: humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, counterdrug operations, peacekeeping, and peace enforcement. It also identifies about 400 tasks and subtasks for soldiers in OOTW. Among the study's conclusions are the following: Training to standard on their unit's mission essential task list is sufficient to prepare soldiers for duty in OOTW. All leaders need skill in negotiating and that requirement increases with increasing rank. With respect to command and control functions, there are no essential differences between OOTW and other types of operations. Negotiators and officers with expertise in psychological operations, foreign areas, and civil affairs are as important as combat power. Well-defined goals, rules of engagement, discipline, and patience are the characteristics of successful OOTW.					
14. SUBJECT TERMS Operations, Humanitarian Assistance, Disaster Relief, Counterdrug operations, Peacekeeping, Peace Enforcement				15. NUMBER OF PAGES	
				16. PRICE CODE	
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT UNCLASSIFIED	18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE UNCLASSIFIED	19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT UNCLASSIFIED	20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT		

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

1. **General.** This report on OOTW constitutes the aggregation of contributions from many persons. With but one exception, all persons work in components of the TRADOC Analysis Center (TRAC). The following listing provides the organization, the persons, and their primary focus with respect to their contribution to the study. Much was done by all outside their primary-focus areas.

2. **Specific.**

a. TRAC, White Sands Missile Range, Drs. E. George, P. Kinney, and R. Pischel, Misses F. Howard and M. Stapp, and Mr. G. Jackson. The primary focus was training and the soldier's tasks in OOTW.

b. TRAC, Fort Lee, Mr. J. Noble and CPT M. Hayes. The primary focus was support to counterdrug operations.

c. TRAC, Scenario and Wargaming Center, MAJ B. Rickert. The primary focus was peacekeeping and peace enforcement.

d. TRAC, Studies and Analysis Center, CPT R. Coy. The primary focus was humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.

e. TRAC, Operations Analysis Center, Dr. H. Mayer. The primary focus was coordination.

f. Combined Arms Center, Battle Command Battle Laboratory, LTC G. Knapp. The primary focus provided access to transcriptions of interviews.

ABSTRACT

This report provides information about operations other than war (OOTW) and provides a task analysis of OOTW activities. The study deals with 4 of the 13 OOTW activities identified in FM 100-5. They are: humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, counterdrug operations, peacekeeping, and peace enforcement. It also identifies about 400 tasks and subtasks for soldiers in OOTW.

Among the study's conclusions are the following: Training to standard on their unit's mission essential task list is sufficient to prepare soldiers for duty in OOTW. All leaders need skill in negotiating and that requirement increases with increasing rank. With respect to command and control functions, there are no essential differences between OOTW and other types of operations. Negotiators and officers with expertise in psychological operations, foreign areas, and civil affairs are as important as combat power. Well-defined goals, rules of engagement, discipline, and patience are the characteristics of successful OOTW.

OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1-1. Purpose. The purpose of this paper is to present information and data on the conduct of operations other than war (OOTW) and to provide a task analysis of OOTW activities.

1-2. Background.

a. The nature of the threat to the United States and to world peace has changed since the end of the cold war. The monolithic enemy, the former Soviet Union, no longer exists. In its place, elements of international instability present a different set of threats to peace and stability. The new threats stem from several distinctly different sources. On one hand, there are economic threats caused by natural disasters and by drug-oriented criminal cultures. On the other hand, there are the continuing ethnic, nationalistic, religious, and economic tensions between factions or nations. Those tensions, if neither controlled nor dissipated, often find expression in anarchy, armed struggles between factions, and warfare between nations.

b. The United Nations and the United States have accepted responsibility for providing humanitarian assistance and aid in nation building to countries requiring economic relief. They also provide peacekeeping and peace enforcement forces to assist in the restoration of peace and stability among nations. These and other than war operations have required the employment of military forces because of their ability to respond quickly with the equipment and manpower needed to produce results and because of their capability to deal with armed factions. The operations have acquired the OOTW label.

c. The TRADOC Analysis Center initiated this effort to explore the implications for the U.S. Army as it confronts these new challenges. Of particular interest was the identification of the kinds of tasks that the Army will be expected to accomplish in the OOTW area, and whether traditional training methods and unit organizations must be altered to enable the Army to successfully execute these missions.

1-3. The purpose of OOTW. FM 100-5, Operations, provides the following doctrinal statement of purpose for OOTW. OOTW are designed to promote regional stability, maintain or achieve democratic end states, retain U.S. influence and access abroad, provide humane assistance to distressed areas, protect U.S. interests, and assist U.S. civil authorities.

1-4. The problem. The U.S. Army has often in its history supported policies of the U.S. Government by conducting operations short of war. Following the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the end of the cold war, the U.S. Army stands on the international scene as a "911" force that is equipped and available to respond to situations of instability and distress throughout the world.

However, on one hand, the Army's resources are not unlimited and, on the other, responding to calls for help from the United Nations (UN) reduces the Army's capability to respond to war in defense of the national interest. Preparation for war is the Army's top priority. Therefore, interest focuses on OOTW to determine just what is required by those operations and to determine the extent that those requirements degrade the Army's ability to respond to war. This paper is an initial approach to the problem.

1-5. Scope. FM 100-5 lists 13 OOTW activities. This paper considers four of those activities. They are: humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, support to counterdrug operations, peacekeeping, and peace enforcement.

1-6. Approach. Information and data for this paper were acquired through searches of the literature, interviews, the Command and General Staff College Course (CGSC) C520 (OOTW), and a conference on OOTW.

1-7. Organization of this paper. First, the four OOTW activities are discussed in the context of specific recent operations. Next, the soldier's tasks are discussed with reference to training requirements. A general discussion is then followed by conclusions. In addition to supporting details, the appendixes include excerpts of interviews with senior leaders who have had experience in OOTW, and a list of about 400 OOTW-specific tasks and subtasks.

CHAPTER 2

HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE AND DISASTER RELIEF

2-1. Introduction.

a. Hurricane Andrew is the model for disaster relief operations. The magnitude of the response was large. Over 23,000 soldiers, sailors, marines, and airmen were deployed in security, humanitarian assistance, and cleanup in south Florida. In addition to the military participation, all the other agencies described in the Federal Response Plan (FRP) were there. Lessons learned and experience gained in the Hurricane Andrew response have been applied in subsequent disasters.

b. The hurricane struck on 24 August 1992. On 27 August, President Bush ordered the Army to assist the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). On 28 August, Joint Task Force (JTF) Andrew was formed with LTG Ebbesen in command. Ten hours after the alert, the 2d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division, commanded by COL Zanni Smith, was in south Florida. The brigade's initial mission was to provide security against looters and to conduct urban search and rescue until more forces and support agencies could arrive. In addition to the brigade, the division sent its tactical command post (CP) to control very important person (VIP) visits, as well as to coordinate with other agencies. By deploying the division tactical CP, the brigade was able to focus its efforts entirely on security and urban search and rescue operations.

c. The JTF mission was the following: Beginning 28 August 1992, JTF was to establish support operations in the vicinity of Miami, Florida, in support of relief efforts following Hurricane Andrew. The JTF also was to establish field feeding sites, storage/distribution warehousing, cargo transfer operations, local/line haul transportation operations, and other logistical support to the local population. The mission statement was developed by United States Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) in consultation with the Department of Defense (DOD).

d. The implied missions were:

(1) Provide shelter. Tents were provided and erected.

(2) Operate feeding and water facilities. JTF set up mobile kitchens and provided water trailers to meet humanitarian needs.

(3) Provide assistance to other Federal agencies. Other agencies lacked equipment and personnel. The DOD was tasked to provide both to assist them in carrying out their emergency support functions.

(4) Provide assistance to state/local government organizations. Members of the JTF were the first support on the scene. Commanders of these organizations immediately had to coordinate with state and local government agencies until FEMA arrived and took over.

(5) Provide security against looters. The military showed its presence, but lacked authority to apprehend. They served as the eyes and ears of the police.

2-2. The Federal Response Plan.

a. When disaster threatens a community, local government and private organizations take action. Their goal is to save lives and help people cope with the chaos. Most of the time, with the help of the state, they have the skills and the equipment to do the job. But when the destruction goes beyond local and state capabilities, Federal help is needed. Typically, the Federal role is financial, providing grants and low-interest loans to individuals, businesses, and communities. Such assistance becomes available beginning about one week after the disaster has occurred.

b. But when the local and state governments are overwhelmed by a catastrophic disaster, the Federal Government is called in at once to mobilize resources, and sometimes to perform the response functions normally carried out by the local and state governments. This is when the U.S. Government implements the FRP. The concept of the FRP is simple. In a disaster, the Federal Government provides local and state governments with personnel, technical expertise, equipment, and other resources, and assumes an active role in managing the response.

c. Resources are provided by 1 or more of 26 Federal departments and agencies and the American Red Cross. Resources are grouped into 12 emergency support functions (ESFs). A list of the ESFs follows. Each ESF is headed by a primary agency. Other agencies provide support as needed. The DOD is the primary agency for ESF-3, Public Works & Engineering, and ESF-9, Urban Search & Rescue. DOD is also the largest supporter of the other ESFs.

d. Federal assistance is coordinated by the Federal coordinating officer (FCO), who is appointed by the President, and by the Emergency Response Team (ERT). They operate out of a Disaster Field Office (DFO) near the site of the disaster. The twelve ESFs and their primary agencies follow.

- ESF-1 Transportation: Department of Transportation
- ESF-2 Communications: National Communications System
- ESF-3 Public Works & Engineering: USA Corps of Engineers
- ESF-4 Firefighting: U.S. Forest Service
- ESF-5 Information and Planning: FEMA
- ESF-6 Mass Care: American Red Cross
- ESF-7 Resource Support: General Services Administration
- ESF-8 Health & Medical Services: U.S. Public Health Service
- ESF-9 Urban Search & Rescue: DOD
- ESF-10 Hazardous Materials: Environmental Protection Agency
- ESF-11 Food: Department of Agriculture
- ESF-12 Energy: Department of Energy

The chart in figure 2-1 displays the sequence of activities in the FRP following the occurrence of a disaster.




Figure 2-1. Federal Response Plan

2-3. Joint task force organization.

a. JTF Andrew was commanded by LTG Ebbesen. He received tasks from the FCO of FEMA, Mr. May. The Army forces were commanded by LTG Luck, Commander of the 18th Airborne Corps. The major units under his command were: 82d Airborne Division, 10th Mountain Division, 18th Avn Brigade, 16th Military Police (MP) Brigade, 20th Engineer Battalion, and the Dragon Brigade of the 18th Airborne Corps.

b. Naval forces were commanded by CPT Williams. The Navy provided six ships for the relief operation.

c. TF Arwood, commanded by MG Arwood, United States Marine Corps (USMC), was a logistic support group consisting of an ordnance battalion, a main support battalion, a supply and services company, and two transportation companies. The Marine Corps also provided a Special Purpose Marine Amphibious Group TF under the command of Colonel Rodriquez.

d. The Air Force provided seven officers from the Air Mobility Command under the command of BG Short.

- e. An organization chart for JTF Andrew appears in figure 2-2.




Figure 2-2. JTF organization

2-4. Army forces task organization.

a. When the disaster relief operation began, the 82d Airborne Division sent TF Falcon, their 2d Brigade, to assist with the relief operation. After things stabilized a little, the 82d Airborne Division handed the operation to the 10th Mountain Division. The 10th Mountain Division carried the operation to its conclusion. In addition to the 10th Mountain Division, 1st Corps Support Command (COSCOM) provided support.

b. An organization chart appears in figure 2-3.

2-5. Remark on organization. If a corps or Army commander is on the scene, the following question might be asked: Who is in charge? The answer is that the FCO from FEMA, appointed by the President, is in charge. In Hurricane Andrew, Mr. Phil May, the FCO, represented FEMA. If he needed any support from the DOD, he had authority to task LTG Ebbesen. There were occasions when a tasking seemed unreasonable, but the JTF staff and the FEMA staff were able to work out differences before the tasking went to paper.




Figure 2-3. Army forces task organization

2-6. Remarks on the operation.

a. The following quote from COL Zanni Smith, CDR, 2d Brigade, 82d Airborne, establishes the nature of the operation: "... you've got to treat it as a military operation. Understand what the conditions are, and if you have good common sense in what you do; as far as what your staff does, it does essentially the same thing, just under a different set of conditions." COL Smith emphasized that an OOTW mission is not different from a wartime mission when it comes to staff planning. The approach is to treat the disaster relief operation as any other military operation. That is to conduct a mission analysis, make command and staff estimates, and assign subordinate unit missions. It was observed that special training was unnecessary. Execution of the mission was decentralized to company level.

b. Through decentralization, the JTF was better able to coordinate with and support the local communities. The companies were able to build rapport with the civilian leadership. The central feature of the operation was to locate key structures (e.g., government buildings, schools, churches, etc.) and set up disaster relief "hubs." Within the hubs, civilian agencies coordinated with the military and with the disaster victims to ensure prompt relief.

c. Another important feature of the operation was the role of the Army in its prevention of looting through its presence and in serving as the eyes and ears of the police. The rules of engagement (ROE) were developed by the JTF headquarters (HQ) and coordinated with the civilian authorities. The MPs were familiar with this type operation but the rest of the Army was not. The ROE were essentially as follows: show presence, but make no attempt at apprehension; don't shoot, call the police.

d. The key to the operation's success was the interaction between the Army's leadership and the civilian community. By decentralizing down to company level, the platoons were able to patrol for looters and gangs at night, and to repair infrastructure during the day. By living and working within the community, they were able to establish rapport. One company commander held townhall meetings with the community in his assigned area. Through townhall meetings, he was able to identify civilian leadership and eventually pass the relief operation to them.

e. Some key players were the Public Affairs Office (PAO), the chaplain, and higher HQ. The JTF used the media to broadcast the locations of the "hubs" where people could get supplies and assistance. The chaplain was able to coordinate with local pastors and religious leaders on an equal footing. Contact with the churches was central in getting tied into the community. The higher HQ were able to take pressure off the units doing the work by escorting VIPs and coordinating with the civilian agencies involved.

2-7. Ending the operation.

a. The time to withdraw the Army from disaster relief operations is made apparent by indicators that suggest things are returning to a normal state. Prime indicators are:

- (1) Electricity has been restored to the community.
- (2) People begin to occupy their homes again.
- (3) Demand for work by the troops has decreased.
- (4) Schools have reopened.

b. The JTF was "disestablished" 15 October 1992; it lived for 48 days.

2-8. Lessons learned.

a. The JTF HQ, Second Army Staff, had never worked together. The staff was created from all branches of the service. BG House, appointed J-3, recommended that the DOD task

individuals in staff jobs across the military to wear two hats. The primary hat is for their current job and the second hat is for a disaster relief staff. Then, they can keep current with events, meet annually, and create generic orders that can be easily implemented when needed.

b. The military needs to hand the operation to civilian authority quickly. If the military remains in control too long, either of two adverse things may happen. First, hostility may develop in a community that feels it is being occupied. Second, the community can become dependent on the military and may not accept responsibility for control of its own affairs.

2-9. Modeling.

a. To respond to the challenge of providing immediate relief to the population in a devastated region, FEMA and the Defense Nuclear Agency (DNA) have joined forces to adapt nuclear-effects technology for natural and technological disaster planning. DNA has created an All-hazards Situation Assessment Program (ASAP) to assess the damage from natural disasters and to estimate resources required for an appropriate Federal response. The absence of such a system in Hurricane Andrew prompted the development.

b. The model includes hurricanes, earthquakes, firespread, radiation, and chemical spills. Commercial and Government data bases on the U.S. infrastructure were collected and linked into a commercial geographic information system (GIS) architecture. Available disaster models from DOD, FEMA, and other Government agencies were collected and joined with DNA models for adaptations to natural disaster assessments. The system provides cross-agency compatibility and is used by FEMA, Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) (Policy), Space and Strategic Defense Command, the Louisiana Maneuvers (LAM) TF, the Joint Warfare Analysis Center, and the National Airborne Operations Center. The system operates on a unix-based workstation. A site license is required and 10 gigabytes (GB) of storage are recommended.

2-10. Other humanitarian operations. U.S. forces have been engaged in other recent humanitarian operations. The following list provides the names of the operations, their locations, and the starting and ending dates for Federal involvement.

- Provide Comfort, Northern Iraq, from April 1991 to July 1991.
- Sea Angel, typhoon in Bangladesh, from May 1991 to June 1991.
- Firey Vigil, volcano in Philippines, from June 1991 to June 1991.
- Restore Hope, Somalia, from December 1992 to May 1993.
- UNOSOM II, Somalia, from May 1993 to March 1994.
- Typhoon Omar, Guam, from August 1992 to August 1992.
- Hurricane Iniki, Hawaii, from September 1992 to September 1992.
- Midwest floods, U.S. Midwest, from July 1993 to September 1993.
- LA earthquake, California, from January 1994 to January 1994.
- Uphold Democracy, Haiti, from September 1994 - ongoing.

CHAPTER 3

SUPPORT TO COUNTERDRUG OPERATIONS

3-1. Introduction.

a. Since Secretary of Defense Richard B. Cheney's DOD letter of September 1989, the military has been actively supporting drug law enforcement agencies (LEAs) at home and abroad. Counterdrug operations are led by foreign or domestic LEAs. The military support to those operations consists primarily of providing additional personnel, equipment, and expertise in intelligence acquisition and in operational planning. Some of the Federal agencies involved include: the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), U.S. Customs Service, U.S. Coast Guard, Department of Immigration & Naturalization (Border Patrol), Department of State, Department of Agriculture, Treasury Department, U.S. Marshal's Service, and the DOD. The counterdrug program demands a long-term commitment by all.

b. The counterdrug program has two operational targets: supply and demand. The Army provides support to those programs that target supply. Subordinate components of the system of supply are: the production of raw materials, the manufacture and packaging of the product, storage of the product at various transfer nodes, and the various modes of transportation among the nodal points of the movement of the drugs.

3-2. The supply reduction operation.

a. Some definitions follow:

- (1) A kingpin is the head of an international drug organization in a source country.
- (2) A kingpin organization moves large quantities of drugs.
- (3) A targeted kingpin organization (TKO) is among those drug organizations that move the greatest quantities of drugs and, therefore, is a primary target for counterdrug operations.

b. The DEA is the Federal Government's single-mission law enforcement agency that leads the nation's war on drugs. The DEA identifies kingpins by name. The CIA has a program called the "linear strategy." By linear strategy they mean attacking the drug organization from the top down. DEA and CIA are working with military support to execute the TKO/linear strategy.

c. The concept for military-supported counterdrug operations is partitioned into five phases.

(1) In the first phase, task force mobilization, the size and composition of the required force is determined, appropriate personnel are identified; the force is assembled, trained, and transported to the area of operations (AO).

(2) In the second phase, intelligence gathering, the cultivation sites, drug production facilities, and transportation routes are determined.

(3) In the third phase, surveillance, observation of cultivation sites and production facilities is conducted to identify law violators.

(4) In the fourth phase, action, decisive action takes place. Cultivation sites and production facilities are destroyed. Transportation routes are blocked, drugs are interdicted, members of TKOs are arrested, with the actual arrest being made by the appropriate law enforcement agency.

(5) In the fifth phase, after completion of the mission, the task force is demobilized.

3-3. Rules of engagement. Title 10 military support to drug law enforcement agencies (DLEAs) is governed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) peacetime ROE. The military personnel deployed to border areas are authorized to be armed with their individual issue weapons for self-defense. When threatened with deadly force, they may return fire to defend themselves and the law enforcement personnel who generally accompany them and others who may be present. These general rules provide adequate protection for military personnel engaged in counterdrug operations. Title 32 military support to DLEAs is governed by similar rules as modified by each state governor.

3-4. Specific tasks assigned. The troop units supporting DLEAs are assigned tasks that are consistent with their training and the equipment in their possession. For example, reconnaissance units are located and positioned for surveillance operations in accordance with their doctrine and training. Therefore, there is no requirement to undertake specialized training because of the counterdrug mission. The specialized aspects of counterdrug operations are conducted by personnel of the DLEAs.

CHAPTER 4

PEACEKEEPING AND PEACE ENFORCEMENT

4-1. Introduction.

a. *Peacekeeping.* Peacekeeping operations support diplomatic efforts to maintain peace in areas of potential conflict. They stabilize conflict among belligerent nations and, in order to do so, require the consent of all parties involved in the dispute. The peacekeeping force deters violent acts by its presence at violence-prone locations.

b. *Peace enforcement.* Peace enforcement operations are military intervention operations in support of diplomatic efforts to restore peace or to establish conditions for a peacekeeping force between hostile factions that may not be consenting to intervention and may be engaged in combat. Peace enforcement implies the use of force to coerce hostile factions to cease and desist from violent actions. Units conducting peace enforcement must be prepared to apply combat power to restore order and to return the environment to conditions more conducive to civil order and discipline.

c. Although FM 100-5, Operations, identifies peacekeeping and peace enforcement as two distinct OOTW activities, they are treated together here because the boundary between the two can be blurred, if not invisible.

4-2. Command and control (C2).

a. *Structure.* Figure 4-1 presents a simplified diagram of the C2 structure found in both the Somalia and Kurdish operations. With the exception of the nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and the private volunteer organizations (PVOs), this C2 structure was used in Desert Storm. The JTF commander reports directly to his national command authority (NCA), but also maintains close coordination with the overarching UN or coalition organization. One of the problems faced by the JTF commander in both Somalia and Kurdistan was that many of the NGOs and PVOs operated independently without coordinating their movements or activities with anyone else.

b. *Implied mission.* Irrespective of the specific mission, the implied mission for OOTW, particularly for peacekeeping and peace enforcement, is to restore and maintain order. No effective assistance or relief can be provided until a secure and stable environment is established. The force commander also has the implied primary mission of protecting his force.




Figure 4-1. OCONUS OOTW C2

c. *OOTW conditions.* The situation in OOTW can be, at least initially, confused and very fluid. There can be several opposing factions, each with its own agenda and goals. Soldiers then find themselves in a hostile environment with no clearly defined enemy, carrying out their assigned mission under restrictive ROE. Complicating the situation is the presence of numerous NGOs and PVOs from around the world, as well as military units from other nations. Conditions that complicate the execution of the soldier's tasks may be man-made as indicated above or the causes may be natural and due to such things as terrain and weather.

d. *OOTW tasks.* For soldiers, the nature of the tasks to be done does not change; guard duty is guard duty, maintenance is maintenance, patrolling is patrolling, etc. The appendix to this paper lists about 400 tasks and subtasks, and the conditions under which the tasks are carried out can vary. Leaders have additional tasks that, in a sense, may be unique to OOTW. Leaders must practice skills in negotiation, coordination, liaison, and be the model of neutrality.

4-3. JTF for Operation Restore Hope (Somalia). The chart in figure 4-2 describes the troop units of the U.S. Army and the allies that participated in Operation Restore Hope. The JTF HQ was drawn from HQ, 10th Mountain Div, and augmented with liaison cells. The JTF commander controlled only the ground forces involved in the operation. The air, naval, and marine forces were controlled by the theater commander-in-chief (CINC). Most of the units assigned to the JTF were organic to the 10th Mountain Div. However, all the civil affairs and psychological operations (PSYOPS) units, as well as most of the MPs and engineers, were attached to the JTF from elsewhere. Several of these attached units joined the JTF only after the need for them became apparent as the situation in Somalia developed.

Bde, 10th Mtn Div(-)	41 Engr Bn	Division Troops (Cont)
2/87 IN	10 MP Co	33 Fin Spt Unit
3/14 IN	511 MP Co	27 Pub Aff Tm
0 Avn Bde(-)	548 S&S Bn	28 Pub Aff Tm
5/158 Avn(-)	36 Engr Grp	10 Tgt Acq Det
3/17 Recon Sqdn	430 Engr Bn (Cbt) (Hvy)	10 Liaison Det
7/159 AVIM(-)	642 Cbt Spt Equip Co	Long Rge Surveil De
E/25 AVIM(-)	63 Cbt Spt Equip Co	
0 DISCOM	720 MP Bn	1st Bn Royal Australian Regiment
210 FSB	571 MP Co	
710 Main Spt Bn	976 MP Co	
200 Supply Det	Division Troops	Royal Moroccan Forces Group
59 CM Co	711 Postal Co	
0 Sig Bn(+)	129 Postal Co	1st Para Bn (Belgium)
10 MI Bn(-)	10 PSC	
PSYOP Group(-)	280 MP Det (CID)	
6 Civ Affairs Bn(-)	60 MP Det (CID)	

Figure 4-2. Somalia task organization

4-4. JTF for Operation Provide Comfort (Kurdistan). The chart in figure 4-3 describes the troop units in Operation Provide Comfort. That operation was designed to help the Kurds survive in the mountains and then to protect them from the Army of Iraq. The JTF HQ was a staff group formed by the CINC, U.S. European Command (EUCOM). The composition of the JTF HQ changed as the situation evolved. Initially Provide Comfort was an air operation, so the JTF HQ consisted primarily of Air Force personnel. As ground operations became necessary, the JTF HQ changed its personnel. The JTF units were drawn from forces already deployed for Desert Storm. These units, for the most part, had never worked together. Consequently, liaison, not only with the Kurds and allied units, but also among U.S. units, became critical.

Bde, 3 ID	354 Civil Affairs Bde
3/325 IN Bn (Abn)	96 CA Bn
8 Engr Bde	6 PSYOPS Bn
94 Engr Bn	431 Civ Aff Co
8 MP Bde	432 Civ Aff Co
284 MP Co	345 Pub Aff Det
4/3 Avn Bde	
6-6 Cav	Various Spanish, French,
1/3 Avn Bn	Italian, and British units
3 FSB	from detachment through
501 FSB	company size
72 EOD Det	

Figure 4-3. Kurdish relief task organization

CHAPTER 5

TRAINING AND TASKS

5-1. Introduction. An opinion has circulated that in OOTW soldiers execute tasks that are unique to OOTW. Accordingly, such tasks are thought to be outside the mission essential task list (METL) for units. Such an opinion is questionable. The rationale for questioning the opinion appears in the following two-part discussion. In addition, the appendix contains excerpts from interviews with senior leaders who have had experience in OOTW, and those leaders emphasize the point that OOTW tasks for soldiers are not unique.

5-2. Rationale.

a. The questionable opinion may have been spawned by the availability of published information that could be misleading. For example, the proposed final publication, dated November 1992, of Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War, Joint Pub 3-07, devoted 20 pages to a matrix that cross-classified 6 low-intensity conflict (LIC) operating categories and their 33 subordinate types of operations with 547 instability indicators. Some have described the resulting matrix of 21,333 cells as a task analysis. The idea of unique LIC tasks may have been created by that matrix and the idea may have stuck. But the matrix does not constitute a task analysis. It is simply a listing of indicators, presumably related to causal factors, that could destabilize a nation with respect to its information, resources, population, organization, operations, economy, and politics. The cells of the matrix identify the presence or absence of a possible relationship between LIC operations and the indicators. The 6 LIC operating categories are predecessors of the 13 OOTW activities presented in the current capstone manual on operations, FM 100-5.

b. It should not be unexpected that an Army prepared to conduct sophisticated operations across the complete spectrum of cold war through nuclear war should be capable of conducting the tasks that may be involved in OOTW without its soldiers receiving additional specialized training. At an elemental level the point may be illustrated with a trivial example. A soldier guarding Government property in the Sinai Desert is executing the same task as another soldier guarding property at Fort Bragg. To the extent that conditions vary in different regions, the common sense, flexibility, and adaptability of the American soldier are sufficient to ensure a proper response fitting those conditions. As is often said with respect to one's choice of tactics, "It all depends on the situation." The relevant point is that the selected tactic is drawn from a repertoire based on past training and experience. So it is with tasks in OOTW.

c. With respect to the mind-set of the soldier, two points may require some emphasis. The emphasis relates to attitude rather than skill in specific tasks. The soldier must be impressed with the necessity to hold the ROE inviolate. In addition, he should be sufficiently aware of the culture and traditions of the affected population to avoid committing acts that are culturally offensive.

5-3. OOTW skills for officers.

a. *Introduction.* OOTW does require special skills of officers. They must be skilled in the arts of negotiation and coordination, and they must be able to maintain a neutral position when dealing with opposing factions.

b. *Negotiation.* All commanders and senior staff officers should be skilled in the art of negotiating. They must deal not only with diverse elements of an unstable population and its competing representatives, but also with NGOs and PVOs whose objectives and methods may not be consistent with each other or with the Army's preferred course of action. The cultural differences between Americans and the population increase the negotiating difficulty, and that difficulty is increased further by cultural differences among the factions. The successful negotiator understands the cultures involved.

c. *Coordination.* Officers in OOTW must know the resources and the capabilities of the NGOs and the PVOs, as well as those of the foreign military forces, in order to be able to plan for the coordinated and effective use of those resources.

d. *Endurance.* Officers in OOTW must exemplify steadfast and single-minded pursuit of purpose and they should instill a corresponding sense of perseverance in the troops who carry out the OOTW program which, to the troops, may seem to be without end.

e. *Neutrality.* Officers in OOTW must present a believable appearance of neutrality through actions as well as words. When the perception of neutrality is lost, then the OOTW efforts are no longer seen as credible; this is especially meaningful in peacekeeping and in peace enforcement.

5-4. Conclusions.

a. Training to standard for the unit's METL is sufficient to prepare soldiers for duties in OOTW. (See appendix A for senior-leader testimony on this point.)

b. Since unique soldier tasks for OOTW may not exist, the lists of tasks that soldiers could perform in OOTW consist of all tasks contained in the manuals and publications that cover tactics, techniques, and procedures used in training, garrison duty, and warfighting.

CHAPTER 6

DISCUSSION

6-1. Problem identification.

a. In war, before troops are committed to combat, the threat is carefully considered. Similarly, before troops are committed to OOTW, it is essential that the problem that gives to the apparent need for an OOTW response be carefully considered and properly identified. The root cause, not the symptoms of trouble, must be understood as the problem. The Army and its resources must not be squandered in the treatment of symptoms. The situation in Somalia is illustrative. A significant portion of the population in Somalia was starving. The UN and the U.S. Army responded in a humanitarian assistance operation. That operation was intended to provide food to the population through a system of secure transportation and food distribution points. The starving population was not the basic problem, it was a symptom of trouble. The problem was the collapse of effective central government and the consequent anarchy. Starvation was a consequence of the anarchy.

b. It is always better to get an approximate answer to the correct problem rather than an exact answer to the wrong problem. In OOTW it pays to take the time to identify the real problem. Whether or not the real problem should then be addressed is a political matter. But the U.S. Army should not be engaged in the treatment of symptoms of trouble. That effort will not be concluded with success. Treating the problem in Somalia as a food distribution problem is a case in point.

6-2. Mission changes.

a. Because of the initial indefiniteness that may be associated with an OOTW mission, the mission may be subject to change. Change should not be unexpected. Three common ways in which OOTW missions may change follow.

- (1) Mission shift: the mission is changed in direction.
- (2) Mission shrink: the mission's scope is reduced.
- (3) Mission creep: the mission is gradually enlarged.

b. Mission creep appears to be the predominant type of change experienced in humanitarian operations but it applies to others as well. The implication that follows from operations subject to change is that one must not only reexamine goals and objectives but also continually reexamine the ROE and organizational structure and update them, as required.

6-3. Varying conditions. Just as wars, campaigns, battles, engagements, and expeditions vary according to conditions, and especially to mission, enemy, terrain, troops, and time available (METT-T), so, also, does OOTW. The number of different combinations of varying conditions that could confront OOTW is an uncountable large number. Therefore, it is neither reasonable nor possible to lay out in advance the set of possible conditions that may pertain to an OOTW. Just as in war, one must be prepared in OOTW for the unexpected. This requires leaders and troops who are competent, flexible, well-trained, and in possession of common sense.

6-4. Criteria for success. An important question that arises in the course of carrying out OOTW activities is: When does one stop? Obviously, one wishes to stop when the operation has succeeded. The following criteria provide guidance in reaching the decision to stop.

- The government's operations have been stabilized.
- The levels of stress in the population have been reduced.
- The Government or affected institutions agree that the crisis has passed.

6-5. Future trend for OOTW.

a. The demands for U.S. participation in OOTW will increase. The world's population continues to grow and the world's resources on a per capita basis continue to shrink. Population pressures will tend to dominate in national economic decisions. Based on economic realities, but cloaked in religious, ethnic, and nationalistic demagoguery, the resulting confrontations among nations will produce increasing demands for assistance from the U.S.

b. A potentially important contribution to OOTW lies in the domain of nonlethal devices, both for crowd control and for temporary individual incapacitation.

6-6. Achilles heel. The Achilles heel for the U.S. Army is the demand for specialized troops in OOTW. For example, consider the provision of combat service support (CSS) units in response to nation-building assistance. A minority of CSS units are on active duty. As those active units are siphoned off to OOTW, the Army's readiness for war is diminished disproportionately for the number of battalions involved.

6-7. Civil affairs. The after-action report of the 10th Mountain Div notes that civil affairs should be handled on a top-down basis with top-level support. It points out that civil affairs teams should be in position in the area of the affected population before the arrival of troops in order to prepare the population appropriately for their arrival.

6-8. Model building.

a. *Need.* The development of a quantitative basis for the description and prediction (operations analysis) of the various functions of the units engaged in OOTW requires access to data concerning repeated operations of the same type. Data from those operations can then be used to estimate values of parameters in modeling those operations. Ideally, the number of operations yielding usable data will be large enough to permit part of the data to be used in the

estimation of values of the parameters, and one or more remaining parts to be used to test the hypothesized values.

b. *Resolution.* The information currently available on several large operations (e.g., Somalia) is nonrepetitive and is insufficient for the construction of an adequate data base either for analytical description or for operational planning purposes. With respect to OOTW, the best potential source of essential operational data is in Southern Command (SOUTHCOM). SOUTHCOM has conducted a large number of such operations, but access to the data is only possible by being in Panama. The Exercise Branch, J-3, SOUTHCOM, would make such data available.

CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSIONS

The study concludes the following:

- Training to standard on their unit's METL is sufficient to prepare soldiers for duty in OOTW.
- Leaders of all ranks need skill in the art of negotiation and that requirement increases with increasing rank.
- Negotiators and officers with expertise in psychological operations, foreign areas, and civil affairs are as important as combat power.
- All personnel should know enough of the host nation's cultures to avoid giving offense when interacting with the population.
- Competent translators are required for the exchange of information and ideas regarding problems and solutions.
- With respect to command and staff functions, there are no essential differences between OOTW and other operations.
- The current decisionmaking process designed for war is applicable to OOTW.
- Consideration of METT-T is essential for all assessments, and political implications should be recognized as a factor in all operations.
- Security and force protection are primary concerns of unit and force commanders during OOTW.
- Well-defined goals, ROE, discipline, and patience are characteristics of successful OOTW.

APPENDIX A

INTERVIEW EXCERPTS

A-1. Introduction.

a. This appendix contains testimony from senior leaders and unit commanders who have had experience in OOTW. These excerpts are taken from extended interviews and, individually and collectively, they assert that unique OOTW tasks for soldiers do not exist. The interviews were conducted by LTC Gary Knapp, Battle Command Battle Laboratory, U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, KS

b. Each of the six interviewed officers is identified by name, rank, and affiliation. The rank and affiliation are those appropriate to the time of his OOTW experience. The excerpt is the officer's response to either a question or comment about the preparation or training of the individual soldier for service in OOTW. The responses are transcriptions of oral interviews and, therefore, may lack the smooth flow of the written word.

A-2. LTG Jerry Rutherford, CG, V Corps.

a. Question: What have I left out for OOTW?

b. Response: "I feel very strongly as a corps commander that you should never go away from the basics that we've learned all our lives, and that's just good squad tactics, good firing with the crews on the ranges. Good company, platoon level and below training. Just good basics. I call it blocking and tackling. Don't do anything fancy, and make sure that those are the sound foundations that we've done, everything we've done for the past years I've been in this Army. We are flexible enough to modify the situation, where to go, based on that too."

A-3. MG Paul Blackwell, CG, 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized).

a. Question: Is there any specific training that you think the rapid-deployment battalion needed to be ready for, or did they have to undergo any training to go to Somalia?

b. Response: "I think there is a great danger in deviating from your METL, that you have already established, when the time comes to alert and out-load on short notice. I also think there is a great problem if we decided to make OOTW a METL task. It is my strong opinion that if we look at the warfighting piece of what we're all about, we have the capability through the intelligence, through the flexibility of our soldiers and our commanders, to adapt tactics, techniques, and procedures associated with METL tasks in order to accomplish OOTW kinds of tasks. I feel very strongly about that. I think the worst thing we can do is knee jerk some kind of 11th hour training requirement to meet an in-theater requirement. And I feel very strongly about that. Don't start making OOTW a METL and I'll be happy. At the War College, that's the level where you have to come to grips with it. You have to come to grips with the ROE.

But at the soldier level, it's not different and we've got to protect that so no one thinks it is different."

A-4. MG Anthony Zinni (USMC), Special Assistant to Ambassador Oakley, Director of Operations on Operation Restore Hope, Military Coordinator with Ambassador Armitage on Operation Provide Hope, and Deputy CG and C/S for General Shalikashvili in Operation Provide Comfort.

a. Question: A final open-ended question asked for additional summary comments, if any.

b. Response: "The other thing is what kind of troops do best in this? I've heard it said, maybe we ought to create some units that especially deal with this that are kinder, gentler. That's bull. The better disciplined the troops, the better they perform in these sorts of things. I see this from all the nations. So good discipline, good troops, good small unit leadership is absolutely necessary. I don't think there are any special skills we have to teach PFCs and sergeants. The common sense, the good security measures they take; all those things they would do normally in combat operations directly apply at their level."

A-5. BG Mark Hamilton, variously assigned in El Salvador disarmament and demobilization, Somalia negotiations, and Bosnia assessment.

a. Question: From your observation, is there any significant change in our training focus that the Army should follow, or does our current METL for warfighting suffice in your observations?

b. Response: "My observation is that we may need to do a twist or tweak here or there, but there is no need for any major muscle movement on this. The best instrument for pursuing these OOTW is a motivated trained and disciplined soldier. It's that simple. I made the comment that we've always got to keep in mind that these operations are best done by soldiers with compassion, not the Red Cross with guns. We've got about the right guy. Does he need to have a couple of little tweaks dealing with the press, dealing with the PVOs and NGOs, a couple of introductory kind of things about the UN? To all of the above I would say yes. I don't see the need for major retraining efforts. Perhaps at the officer level it would be good, and again in a short kind of introductory thing. I'm thinking in terms of 3 to 5 hours at the basic course, 8 hours at Leavenworth, maybe 3 days at the War College. Some sort of pretty intense discussion about the need for some negotiating skills, specific vignettes as to the kinds of issues you might face in these situations, that sort of thing."

A-6. BG Freddy McFarren, ADC SPT, 24th Inf Div (Mech).

a. Question: How did that work? (Re: Hurricane Andrew)

b. Response: "Those soldiers worked all day long after constantly doing whatever kind of support they could for the people. There is a great bond here. A lot of people thought we

needed to change our METL and maybe we needed to tweak tactics, techniques, and procedures. But, we came back with everybody saying, 'Hey, we don't need to do anything different.' Our focus has to be on warfighting, that's the most demanding. And we showed ourselves that we can take our current procedures in how we do things and apply them in a peacekeeping operation."

A-7. BG Greg Gile, ADC OPS, 10th Mountain Div.

a. Question: Is there any need to change the training focus of the battalion? (Re: Somalia and Hurricane Andrew)

b. Response: "No."

APPENDIX B
THE OOTW TASK LIST

B-1. Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.

a. *General.* Promote human welfare, reduce pain and suffering, and prevent loss of life or destruction of property after natural or man-made disasters.

b. *C2.*

- Provide command, control, communications and intelligence (C3I) for JTF.
- Provide full range of command and staff functions.
- Develop transient centers and camps.
- Identify key civilian leaders and their supporters.
- Identify political, economical, and social vulnerabilities.
- Coordinate with U.S. and foreign organizations that can contribute and assist.
- Interface with NGOs and PVOs.
- Brief commanders on civil-military operations.
- Administer displaced persons camp.
- Facilitate visits by VIPs and others through affected regions.
- Coordinate with host nation authorities.

c. *Civil affairs.*

- Assess life-threatening needs of people.
- Assess status of nonfriendly military or paramilitary units in area.
- Assess status of existing public services, such as water, electricity, communications, sewage, and transportation systems.
- Assess unique food or shelter needs and host nation's ability to support.
- Identify unique social, ethnic, or religious needs that affect the operation.
- Provide civil administrative support to host government.
- Conduct area assessments and assist in preparing area studies.
- Conduct interviews with NGOs and PVOs.

d. *Civilian relief.*

- Integrate civilian organizations and coordinate their activities.
- Provide military decisionmakers with information on civilian relief organizations.
- Identify lead agencies to represent the NGOs.
- Obtain the NGOs' operational documents.
- Determine the relief organization's: missions, capabilities, and limitations.
- Assist civil authorities with civil relief:
 - Provide food and shelter.
 - Clear debris.
 - Move furniture.
 - Provide construction materials.

- Set up tents with electrical power.
 - Provide potable water.
 - Provide laundry, bath, and light textile renovation service.
- e. *Communications.*
- Establish emergency communications.
 - Provide telephone lines to centers for disaster assistance, life support, and mobile kitchen units.
 - Provide timely information (public affairs).
 - Cooperate with the civilian public affairs unit to establish confidence.
 - Establish radio station to broadcast information.
 - Create newsletter of background information for civilian reporters.
 - Establish communications for basic service.
 - Reconfigure connectivity and add communication equipment.
 - Translate oral and written communications.
- f. *Engineer.*
- Construct refugee camps and establish boundaries.
 - Construct latrine and trash pits for daily use by people.
 - Repair well equipment.
 - Construct rudimentary surface transportation capability.
 - Make emergency repairs for vital facilities.
 - Check damage to highways and bridges.
 - Provide power for hospitals and emergency centers.
 - Drill wells and construct sanitation facilities.
 - Sample well water.
 - Purify, store, and distribute waste.
 - Perform rudimentary construction and repair of public facilities.
 - Construct life support centers.
 - Provide sandbagging, hauling, and dike reinforcement.
 - Repair vehicles and equipment.
 - Provide power generation.
 - Assess local water supplies.
 - Install water purification units.
 - Transport displaced persons.
 - Transport supplies and rations to camps and distribution centers.
 - Clear vehicles, fences, and debris from roads.
 - Clear downed trees from roads.
 - Clear dangling electrical wires.

g. *Logistics.*

- Prepare and distribute food as meals.
- Provide logistical support to move supplies.
 - Take supplies to areas with no water or electricity.
 - Take relief supplies to general disbursing areas.
 - Use warehousing procedures to get supplies from central to distribution points.
- Contract for supplies and services.
- Move large volumes of supplies and equipment.
- Develop plans for replacement of long-haul vehicles and recovery equipment.
- Locate mechanics and tools along routes or in convoys.
- Develop system to ration food.
- Make use of local trucks and drivers to deliver food and supplies.
- Provide food, shelter, water, and medical care.
- Distribute clothing, blankets, and construction material

h. *Medical.*

- Conduct direct medical support operations.
 - Provide medical assistance to victims.
 - Inoculate people against disease.
 - Organize and control donated medical supplies.
 - Assist state mental health teams in support of local population and in collecting mental health data.
 - Spray for mosquitoes.
- Provide medical, dental, and veterinary care to rural areas as needed.
- Assess status of civil police, doctors, firemen, their availability and levels of expertise, especially in preventive medicine.
- Assess medical condition of people and locations.
- Assess sanitary conditions and availability of medical supplies.
- Rehydrate children.
- Provide sanitation and health training.
- Provide high-energy formulas to starving children.
- Work through the local health-care system.
- Establish centers for rehydration, intensive feeding, and normal feeding.
- Educate military medical personnel about oral rehydration salt.
- Equip and staff a medical command and control element.
- Train non-U.S military on medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) requests.
- Provide transportation for civilian relief agencies so they can go where needed.
- Mark medical supplies with unique identifier and keep them separate from others.

i. *Military police.*

- Search refugees for weapons and explosives.
- Establish ROE.
- Establish a confinement facility.
- Extract or evacuate victims.
- Assist public authorities with public safety.

- Guard damaged homes and businesses.
 - Enforce curfews.
 - Prevent looting.
 - Help restore order after prison riot.
 - Provide transportation for police in city.
 - Provide traffic control.
 - Establish security.
 - Advise commander on law enforcement legal matters.
 - Provide military planning and training assistants for domestic law enforcement agencies.
 - Assist law enforcement and counterintelligence missions.
 - Assist at checkpoints.
- j. *Ordnance disposal.*
- Destroy unstable munitions.
 - Clear area of munitions.
 - Distribute flyers to warn population.
 - Encourage population to provide information on location of munitions.
 - Develop procedures for obtaining information regarding munitions.
- k. *Safety.*
- Train soldiers to identify and avoid mines and submunitions.
 - Prevent soldiers from entering high-threat areas.
 - Develop an identification training program.
- l. *Psychological operations.*
- Provide significant quantities of printed information to local population.
 - Plan and conduct PSYOPS.
 - Analyze, target, plan, produce, and disseminate propaganda.
 - Develop tapes to disseminate information to population.
 - Drop leaflets.
 - Plan and conduct counterpropaganda operations.
 - Provide printing plant support.
- m. *Special Forces.*
- Determine the internal organization of the indigenous people.
 - Assign positions in accord with tribal organization.
 - Infiltrate, organize, and train refugees.
 - Train refugees to construct sanitation facilities and water storage areas.
 - Train refugees in prevention and treatment of camp sickness and disease.
 - Sling load supplies.
 - Learn customs of people and follow their customs in interactions with them.
 - Stress daily removal of trash and general police of camp to refugees.
 - Register refugees.

- Evacuate and transport refugees.
- Resettle refugees.

B-2. Support to counterdrug operations.

- Support law enforcement agencies, other U.S. agencies, and foreign governments to interdict the flow of illegal drugs.
- Assist host nations to destroy drug production facilities.
- Assist host nations to prevent the export of illegal drugs.
- Provide nation assistance to help develop economic alternatives to drug production, export, and distribution.
- Assist host nations in monitoring and detecting illegal drugs in transit.
- Provide domestic law enforcement agencies with equipment loans and the use of military facilities.

B-3. Peacekeeping operations.

- a. *C2.*
 - Know UN organization, mission, and background.
 - Enforce UN sanctions.
 - Use UN formats in completing reports.
 - Negotiate and mediate with local-nation leaders and factions.
 - Remain neutral.
 - Be familiar with the problem.
 - Present the peacekeeping-force solution to the problem.
 - Coordinate and integrate the NGOs, PVOs, and International Relief Offices (IROs) in daily activities.
 - Provide C3I for task force.
- b. *Civil affairs.*
 - Protect the human rights of minorities.
 - Protect humanitarian relief efforts.
 - Conduct cultural and religious sensitization for task force.
 - Reestablish local village governments.
- c. *Communications.*
 - Establish and operate a communications network.
 - Maintain liaison with NGOs, PVOs, and IROs.
 - Maintain liaison with host government and allied military units.
 - Perform routine maintenance on communication equipment.
- d. *Engineering.*
 - Provide maps and imagery products.
 - Build base camps.
 - Construct and improve roads.

- Build and repair bridges.
 - Maintain and improve airfields.
 - Construct protective shelters and defensive positions.
- e. *Logistics.*
- Maintain food inventory.
 - Manage contracted interpreters.
 - Manage disposition of personal property.
 - Conduct warehousing and distribution as required.
- f. *Medical.*
- Know types of dangerous wildlife in region and appropriate treatments.
 - Provide first aid.
 - Know first aid and evacuation procedures.
 - Control disposition of human remains.
- g. *Military Police and local security.*
- Know weapons policy and challenging procedures.
 - Deal with stressful situations and violence without becoming a participant.
 - Deter violent acts by presence at high-stress areas.
 - Deter violent acts with nonlethal response.
 - Confiscate weapons at checkpoints.
 - Monitor boundaries.
 - Collect information through observation posts and patrols.
 - React to hostage-taking situations.
 - Prevent pilferage.
 - Control detainees.
 - Patrol urban areas; observe and log events while patrolling.
 - Disarm belligerents.
 - Restore law and order.
 - Open secure routes for movement of people and supplies.
 - Execute cordon and search.
 - Perform mounted and dismounted patrolling.
 - Use checklists for five mission areas:
 - Area assessment.
 - Patrols.
 - Debrief of convoys.
 - Roadblocks.
 - Airfield security.
 - Take precautions to minimize threat from snipers.
 - Develop a response to snipers.
 - Clear and secure all buildings around observation posts, checkpoints, and HQ.
 - Eliminate snipers.

- h. *Observation.*
 - Be able to identify aircraft and vehicles of opposing forces.
 - Function as impartial observers in supervisory and assistance roles.
 - Be familiar with Multinational Force and Observers procedures.
- i. *Ordnance disposal.*
 - Identify, mark, and report all mines and booby traps.
 - Expect changes in mine warfare techniques and technology.
 - Examine wires and wiring.
 - Check all grounds and structures for mines.
 - Collect and properly dispose of duds.
 - Thoroughly check the ground around a mine casualty for other mines.
 - Before departure of convoys, check the route for mines.
- j. *Psychological operations.*
 - Identify signs and symbols of foreign nations.
 - Know the culture to avoid unintended insults.
 - Obtain orientation on terrain and climate.
 - Know what the peacekeeping and other forces are trying to do.
 - Know local customs and basic language phrases.
 - Know principles of stress management.
- k. *Special Forces.*
 - Support diplomatic efforts to maintain peace.
 - Provide current weather and intelligence for entry of force in region.
 - Provide initial assessment of engineering, medical, security, and intelligence.
- l. *General.*
 - Stabilize conflict among belligerents.
 - Conduct reconnaissance and surveillance.
 - Maintain confident presence.
 - Evacuate noncombatants.
 - Prevent terrorism.
 - Be alert and keep low profile.
 - Report suspicious activity.
 - Limit access to information about planned events.
 - Employ unpredictable security procedures.
 - Maintain marksmanship through continuing practice.
 - Know survival skills, including escape and evasion.
 - Know land navigation and range estimation.
 - Know sling load operations.
 - Use civil affairs interpreters whenever possible.
 - Keep operations security (OPSEC) in mind when discussing planned operations.
 - Guard weapons and ammunition.

B-4. Peace enforcement.

a. *General.*

- Support diplomatic efforts to restore peace.
- Use force or the threat of force to coerce hostile factions to cease and desist from violent actions.
- Separate warring factions.
- Restore order.

b. *Command and control.*

- Generate combat power sufficient to convince warring factions of the futility of their opposition.
- Escort factions to cantonments where they will be disarmed and demobilized.
- Protect the factions during disarmament and demobilization.
- Supervise the surrender and destruction of weapons and equipment.
- Officers may have to assume responsibility for negotiations.
- Interact with other Government agencies whose command structure vary and may be fluid.
- Commanders and staffs must understand the situation and the requirements of participating agencies:
 - Maintain an open mind.
 - Be receptive to views of others.
 - Be prepared to compromise.
 - Formulate command positions carefully and present them in a logical and convincing manner.
- Liaison officers must have maturity and expertise and be language qualified or able to work through an interpreter.
- Ensure orderly handover of U.S. responsibilities to relieving forces.
- Provide force protection for U.S. forces in country.
- Enable continued U.S. support of combined operations.
- Ensure continued flow of supplies.
- Assume mission of reaction force.
- Promote conditions for success of civil government.
- Assist in handover of functions to contractors and nongovernment organizations.
- Ensure uninterrupted relief and rebuilding activities.
- Assist other agencies in psychological preparation.
- Disposition of supplies and equipment must be planned and executed.
- Plan for port and airfield operations, to include:
 - Cargo handling.
 - Logistics over the shore.
 - Custom requirements.
- Allocate space to arriving units.
- Ensure adequate sterile staging areas.
- Ensure all operational needs and life support requirements are in adequate supply for covering force.
- Disposition of expendable supplies must be planned.

c. *Civil affairs.*

- Prepare estimates and plans that consider how the political, economic, social, and cultural aspects of the AO affect military operations.
- Advise commander on how military operations affect the local population and legal obligations toward them.
- Coordinate staffing procedures with combatant commands, U.S. Government agencies, and host nation civil and military authorities to determine best method of allocating civil affairs assets.
- Prepare annexes for operations plans (OPLANS), operations orders (OPORDS), and other documentation for use of civil affairs' assets and resources.
- Facilitate mutual understanding of objectives and the required actions to achieve them.
- Provide instruction to U.S. forces, friendly or host nation civil and military officials, and the host nation population in implementing programs useful to the population and in strengthening host nation internal defense and development.
- Recommend to commanders the policy and guidance concerning conduct of military units toward civilians.
- Identify facilities, supplies, labor, and other resources available from the local economy to support operations.
- Plan, coordinate, and supervise dislocated civilian operations to minimize local interference with military operations.
- Support and coordinate humanitarian and disaster relief.
- Assist commanders in planning, screening, and relocating threatened civilians.
- Coordinate civilian resources to support a rear-area protection plan.
- Coordinate military support to civil defense and civic action projects.
- Predict movement of civilians and establish procedures to minimize their interference with military operations.
- Provide technical expertise in civilian functions by using organic civil affairs function specialists.
- Provide information to intelligence system in the form of human intelligence (HUMINT) passively gathered through daily contact with the people.
- Establish civilian administration in accordance with legal mandate of the force.
- Assist in meeting legal obligations to local people.
- Advise on cultural and moral matters.

d. *Engineering.*

- Construct fences, bunkers, and fighting positions.
- Support operations through construction of billeting, utilities, logistical facilities, ports, and airfields.
- Harden structures against direct and indirect fires.
- Clear mines and booby traps.
- Dispose of unexploded ordnance.
- Clear defensive fields of fire.

- e. *Intelligence.*
 - Define the mission.
 - Define the battlefield environment.
 - Analyze host nation.
 - Identify best and worst timelines.
 - Describe battlefield effects.
 - Consider weather and the environment.
 - Evaluate the threat:
 - Identify dissident groups.
 - Add "personalities" order-of-battle factors.
 - Examine composition of units.
 - Evaluate morale of hostile forces.
 - Identify threat tactics and *modus operandi*.
 - Don't overlook nonconventional personnel.
 - Deter threat course of action.
 - Risk management:
 - Identify hazards.
 - Assess the hazard.
 - Make risk decisions.
 - Implement controls.
 - Supervise.
 - Intelligence foe multinational peace operations:
 - Adjust national differences among nations.
 - Unity of effort against common threat.
 - Determine and plan intelligence.
 - Share all relevant and pertinent intelligence.
 - Conduct complementary intelligence operations.
- f. *Logistics.*
 - Identify and prepare base of operations.
 - Select and improve lines of communication.
 - Project and prepare forward logistic base.
 - Identify potential supply sources.
 - Negotiate host-nation agreement.
 - Forecast and store assets forward and afloat.
 - Plan logistic base and logistic security.
 - Identify key elements, to include:
 - Fuel storage and distribution facilities.
 - Seaports.
 - Airports.
 - Storage facilities.
 - Supply routes.
 - Utilities.
 - Define procedures for requesting supplies and support.
 - Plan for maintenance of facilities and equipment.

- g. *Medical.*
 - Coordinate evacuation plans for patients.
 - Protect the viability of blood throughout the distribution system.
 - Ensure that the available equipment and personnel support the use of blood.
 - Arrange for rapid removal of specimens out of AO.
 - Ensure the safety of food, especially that which is locally acquired.
 - Veterinary services should sustain the use of military working dogs and other government-owned animals.
 - Plan predeployment training on field sanitation, arthropod repellent use, and personal hygiene.
- h. *Personnel.*
 - Manage personnel accounting and strength reporting.
 - Manage casualty operations.
 - Manage postal support in AO.
 - Personnel information management to collect, validate, process, and store critical information on soldiers, civilians and units.
- i. *PSYOPS.*
 - Help gain and maintain peace by influencing opinions, emotions, attitudes, and behaviors of belligerents, neutrals, military forces, key communicators, and observers in the region.
 - Prepare the operational area for the introduction of peace enforcement units:
 - Explain the mission.
 - Make a statement of actions to be performed.
 - Identify the peace force uniforms and equipment.
 - Through face to face communication with local audiences, explain:
 - Procedures for the provision of assistance.
 - Assistance to the civilian agencies in public health, sanitation, and safety measures announcements.
 - Crowd management instructions.
 - Provide current news of concern to local audience.
 - Handle requests for local assistance in relief efforts or on behalf of injured or lost task force personnel.
 - Communicate in local language and correct dialect.
 - Present communication as public service announcements and avoid patronizing, manipulating, or favoring special groups.
 - Stress impartiality and neutrality of the operation.
 - Provide essential phrase cards to all personnel prior to arrival in country.
 - Ensure personnel are briefed by area experts on social and political situations.
- j. *Public affairs.*
 - Make public affairs an integral part of operational planning and execution.
 - Make room for local and regional media.
 - Be willing to speak to media and make the soldiers accessible.

- Provide public affairs support to home station.
 - Feed, house, and transport attached media personnel.
 - Arrange for transport or filing of video and print stories daily to meet deadlines.
 - Inform local, U.S., and international public that the member nations and their forces have the military capabilities plus the political legitimacy to succeed.
 - Inform the UN chain of command of incidents or local news reports which are likely to attract diplomatic or media attention.
 - Communicate the nature of the constraints in the ROE regarding the use of force.
- k. *Security.* Know how to use temporarily disabling techniques and technology to:
- Break contact.
 - Support rescue operations.
 - Disperse crowds.
 - Conceal movement.
 - Deny buildings.
 - Mark and track personnel.

APPENDIX C

OPERATIONAL-LEVEL TASKS

C-1. United Nations mandated tasks in Operation UNOSOM II (Somalia).

- a. Monitor compliance of all factions with cease-fire and other agreements.
- b. Prevent resumption of violence; take action as necessary against any faction that violates or threatens to violate the cease fire.
- c. Control heavy weapons of the factions pending destruction or transfer.
- d. Seize small arms of all unauthorized armed elements and secure them.
- e. Secure ports, airfields, and lines of communications required for humanitarian assistance.
- f. Protect personnel, equipment, and installations of UN and nongovernmental organizations, using forceful action as required, including action against armed elements who threaten attack.
- g. Continue the program for mine clearing.
- h. Assist in the repatriation of refugees and displaced persons.
- i. Carry out such other functions as may be authorized by the Security Council.

C-2. General Shalikashvili's orders in Operation Provide Comfort (Northern IRAQ).

- a. Get the Kurds organized.
- b. Get them fed.
- c. Get them under shelter.
- d. Develop a potable water system.
- e. Do good preventive medicine.
- f. Stop the dying, especially the children.
- g. Convince the Kurds to move south to their homes.

APPENDIX D

OOTW HIGH RESOLUTION SCENARIOS

D-1. Introduction. The TRAC Scenario and Wargaming Center (SWC) has developed four high-resolution scenarios (HRS) that involve small unit actions in OOTW. The scenarios were developed in conjunction with students of the Command and General Staff College (CGSC) who were enrolled in the Scenario Development and Wargaming subcourse. In the scenarios, the assumptions, road to war, threat, and friendly forces were derived from current and possible future OOTW settings and missions. The scenarios were completed in June 1994.

D-2. Four-high resolution scenarios.

a. *HRS 501, Convoy Escort.* The scenario provides a force-on-force HRS that depicts a threat light-infantry platoon ambush against a Blue relief convoy during postconflict operations in northeast Asia (NEA).

b. *HRS 502, Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEO).* The scenario depicts a U.S. air assault infantry platoon conducting an opposed NEO of American civilians from a remote village in Latin America (LATAM). The opposition consists of a threat infantry platoon that is prepared to ambush the evacuation forces.

c. *HRS 503, Counterdrug Operation.* The scenario provides a force-on-force HRS that depicts a host-nation platoon supported by U.S. advisors attacking a threat drug transshipment point defended by a reinforced squad in LATAM.

d. *HRS 504, Supply Point Raid.* The scenario provides a force-on-force HRS that depicts a U.S. air assault platoon defending a battalion supply point against a threat militia platoon.

APPENDIX E

THE NORDIC UN TACTICAL MANUAL

E-1. Overview. The Nordic UN tactical manual, published in two volumes, is an excellent encapsulated presentation of peacekeeping activities in OOTW. The manuals are well written and well illustrated. The range of tasks covered is indicated by the table of contents given below.

E-2. Table of contents.

a. *Volume 1.*

- Basic Principles
- General Operational Tasks
- Operational Matters
- Civilian and Humanitarian Tasks
- Command, Control, and Communication System
- Logistics
- Welfare
- Mine and Fire Dangers
- Medical and Hygiene Matters
- Training

b. *Volume 2.*

- Checkpoint and Observation Post Duty
- Search Operations
- Patrolling
- Tailing
- Handling of Infiltrators
- Confiscation of Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives
- Escorting
- Guarding Headquarters and Vital Objects
- Use of Dogs
- Use of Armored Personnel Carriers
- Constructions
- MEDEVAC

APPENDIX F

TECHNOLOGY USEFUL IN OOTW

Devices and systems useful in OOTW are of both old and new technology.

- a. Nonlethal means of crowd control.
 - Stingball: grenade with hard rubber pellets.
 - Flash-bang: bright flash and loud bang.
 - Anti-riot 37mm hand-held pellet weapon.
 - Pepper mace spray.
 - Gas grenades: e.g., tear gas.
 - Police baton.
 - Electric stun.
 - Calmatives.
 - Antiradiation agents.
 - Ballistically employed entanglements.
 - Sticky foam.
- b. Booby trap and mine location, identification, and clearance systems.
- c. Pointer airborne sensor for human movement on ground.
- d. Crossbow control console for remote munitions pods.
- e. Trajectory tracker to source of sniper fire.
- f. Electronic filmless camera system.
- g. Holographic night vision goggles.
- h. Magnifier for night vision device.
- i. Infrared target pointer/illuminator.
- j. Infrared ground commander's pointer.
- k. Thermal sight for M16 rifle.
- l. Flameless ration heater (heat pads).
- m. Infrared marking black-dots for vehicle identification.

- n. Phoenix combat identification device.
- o. M203 covert illuminating cartridge.
- p. M271 60mm covert illuminating cartridge.
- q. XM816 81mm covert illuminating cartridge.
- r. M127A1 hand-held infrared signal parachute.
- s. M49A1 infrared ground trip flares.
- t. Covert listening devices.
- u. Cellular communication with voice scrambler.

APPENDIX G

OOTW INSIGHTS AND MAXIMS

The following list of insights and maxims attempts to extract the essence of OOTW and is not necessarily complete:

In OOTW, the commander's top priority is protecting his force.

Force protection is at risk during redeployment because the focus changes from security to movement home.

In the future, the number of requests for participation in OOTW by the U.S. Army will increase because an increasing world-wide population will exert increasing pressure on diminishing per capita resources. That pressure will be aggravated by nationalistic, ethnic, and religious tensions.

Before U.S. units participate in OOTW, the basic problem affecting the population under stress must be identified, not just the symptoms of trouble. In Somalia the starving population was a symptom. The problem was the collapse of effective central government and the anarchy resulting from that collapse. Starvation was a consequence of the anarchy.

The hierarchy of OOTW objectives must be consistent through different political levels: local, national, international, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the UN. Inconsistency of objectives among the political levels will produce ineffective action.

Immediate notification of an OOTW deployment does not always include a mission statement and commander's intent. That may follow after deployment has begun.

OOTW missions may change in the following ways:

- Mission shift, a change in the mission's direction.
- Mission shrink, reduction of the scope of the mission.
- Mission creep, the mission is gradually enlarged.

Until a clearly defined national objective is established, expect that every OOTW will experience an element of mission creep.

With respect to C2 among the agencies that work in OOTW, the NGOs and the PVOs may not deal directly with either the military or each other. Some of the NGOs and PVOs may be dedicated to the aid of one or more of the contentious factions at the expense of the others.

Just as wars, campaigns, battles, engagements, and expeditions vary according to conditions, and especially to mission, enemy, terrain, troops, and time available, so, also, does OOTW. The potential number of varying conditions confronting OOTW is enormous.

Commanders and staff officers at all levels must be capable of conducting negotiations.

An officer's success in conducting negotiations varies directly with his knowledge and appreciation of the cultures of those with whom he is negotiating.

In OOTW, civil affairs and foreign area officers and negotiators are more important than killing power. The mind is a battlefield in OOTW.

With the exception of the emphasis placed on ROE and an introduction to the culture of the population involved, training to standard on the unit's METL is sufficient to prepare soldiers for duty in OOTW.

Construction of ROE should include input from the Judge Advocate General's office to ensure that legal aspects receive proper consideration.

The ROE must not require troops to carry unloaded weapons in places where the potential for hostile action is high.

The ROE must be disseminated to the lowest level. They must be clearly understood and rehearsed before deployment.

Changes in the situation and in the ROE must be relayed immediately to all echelons.

OOTW units must be provided with translators who are fluent in the languages used in the affected region.

Military forces in support of counterdrug operations are employed consistent with their equipment and training. The DLEAs perform the tasks that require specialization.

Irrespective of the type of operation, long-range redundant communication equipment is required by isolated OOTW units to maintain contact with a distant command structure.

In OOTW, a civil affairs group and a propaganda-oriented communications group should exist to establish and maintain contact, not only with the political parties, but also with the population at large.

An isolated unit assigned an OOTW requires a local HQ cell above it to serve as a buffer and do the following:

- Manage rear-echelon services, logistics, etc.
- Manage visits by VIPs, the press, and others.

In all domestic disaster-relief operations that require the assistance of Federal military forces, the senior military commander responding to the crisis is subordinate to the FCO who is appointed by the President and who represents the FEMA.

To maintain its credibility in peacekeeping operations, the OOTW force must maintain its neutrality and integrity. It must deal firmly, fairly, and truthfully with the antagonists.

Peacekeeping and peace enforcement forces must be prepared to fight defensive actions. Vehicle convoys should travel through disputed territory with an armored advance guard and an armored rear guard.

Structures for headquarters, troops quarters, outposts, and checkpoints should be constructed to withstand the effects of small-arms fire and fragmentation weapons.

Unit chaplains, in addition to serving the morale of the unit, should be encouraged to cooperate with the local religious community. That cooperation may provide the most effective route toward winning the hearts and minds of the people.

The media may be on the ground awaiting your arrival. Keep soldiers informed and inform the media.

Identify liaison teams early and equip them for the mission.

Successful commanders work face-to-face with subordinates.

Sergeants will be called upon to make critical decisions under the most demanding circumstances.

Continuation of training in individual weapons and crew proficiency increases confidence and portrays a sense of readiness to belligerent factions.

American forces will continue to be targets of belligerent forces or individuals during OOTW, regardless of the host nation's position.

Conventional relief-in-place procedure is the best method of rotating forces in OOTW.

Stipulated conditions agreed upon before rotation of forces may change if both forces are not under the same command authority.

Transportation resources are less responsive to redeployment than to deployment because of the reduced sense of urgency.

Criteria used to judge OOTW success are:

- Reduction of stress levels in the population,
- Stabilization of government operations, or
- Return to status quo existing before the crisis.

Insight provided by BG M. Hamilton: long-term peace results from the institution of order with justice. Armies can impose order, but armies cannot impose justice.

Discipline, ROE, negotiation, and patience are essential characteristics of successful OOTW.

APPENDIX H

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